Taming the Wild West: Using Unsecured Bail Bonds in Nevada\u27s Pretrial-Release Program by Miller, Hayley E.
MILLER - 16 NEV. L.J. 1239 - FINAL (1) 7/22/2016  11:13 AM 
 
1239 
TAMING THE WILD WEST: USING 
UNSECURED BAIL BONDS IN NEVADA’S 
PRETRIAL-RELEASE PROGRAM 
 Hayley E. Miller* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1239 
 I. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES BAIL-BOND SYSTEM .................... 1241 
 II. THE CURRENT BAIL INDUSTRY IN NEVADA ...................................... 1245 
 III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT NEVADA BAIL-BOND SYSTEM ....... 1248 
 IV. OTHER STATES’ METHODS OF PRETRIAL-RELEASE REFORM ............ 1253 
 A. Kentucky ..................................................................................... 1253 
 B. Colorado .................................................................................... 1255 
 C. General Criticism of Pretrial Release Programs Using 
Unsecured Bonds ....................................................................... 1257 
 V. NEVADA SHOULD ADOPT UNSECURED BOND PRETRIAL-RELEASE 
METHODS ........................................................................................... 1259 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 1264 
INTRODUCTION 
“What happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas,” right? Maybe. At least that was 
your intention last night. Now, as you “shake the glitter off your clothes”1 and 
stagger out into the hot sun of an early desert morning, you are unsure. Your 
cell phone rings, aggravating the pounding in your head, and your friend’s 
name pops up on the screen. Turns out you need to bail him out of jail, or he is 
going to stay in Las Vegas too.  
                                                        
*  Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2016, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Neva-
da, Las Vegas. The author would like to dedicate this note as a thank you to her family, 
Bruce, Crystal, and Holden (TM!) Miller for their unwavering and unconditional love and 
support. She would also like to thank Katherine Frank, Gil Kahn, and the entire Volume 16 
staff of the Nevada Law Journal for their assistance in editing this piece. 
1  KATY PERRY, Waking Up in Vegas, on ONE OF THE BOYS (Capitol Records 2008). The cho-
rus of this song includes, “Get up and shake the glitter off your clothes now; That’s what you 
get for waking up in Vegas.” Id. 
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Bail is “the money required to obtain release from pretrial detention.”2 
Chances are you and your friend will be unable to front the money yourselves, 
as the average cost of bail is a few thousand dollars, perhaps more if your 
friend is charged with multiple crimes. So, to get out of jail your friend will 
need a bail bond. Bail bonds are legal agreements, secured by the cost of bail, 
that guarantee a person’s appearance at trial. Lucky for you, downtown Las 
Vegas is prime real estate for a plethora of bail bondsmen, most of whom are 
willing to help—for a price. Nevada, like most states, is home to the decidedly 
devious industry of commercial bail bondsmen. The commercial bail industry 
deals in secured bonds. Essentially, a defendant unable to make bail obtains 
pretrial release by paying a bondsman a fee to secure the bail bond. The de-
fendant also signs a contract guaranteeing to appear in court and designating 
collateral for the forfeiture of the bond if the defendant skips town.  
On its face, the system sounds genuine. Why not provide a service to make 
posting bail easier? The answer lies in the nature of for-profit business: finan-
cial incentive. The prevalence of the commercial bail industry has contributed 
to increases in the cost of bail. As a result, more people must wait behind bars 
in the period before trial, despite being presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
Today, the majority of people in pretrial detention simply cannot pay for free-
dom.3 Further, the commercial bail industry can tempt judicial officers into eth-
ical violations, such as receiving “kickbacks” from bail bondsmen for bond re-
ferrals.4 And, the industry breeds a new type of vigilante justice, as bounty 
hunters search for and recapture defendants who flee.  
But, there is a new sheriff in town. Pretrial-release systems utilizing unse-
cured bonds are a proven alternative to commercial bail bonds. An unsecured 
bond allows a defendant to make bail without needing to put up cash. Instead, if 
a defendant is rated as “low risk” through a pretrial analysis, he is released on 
supervision and still held liable for a subsequent failure to appear in court. Four 
states have outlawed commercial bail practices and implemented unsecured-
bond pretrial-release programs. Many more states utilize some type of unse-
cured-bond pretrial-release program in conjunction with secured bonds. How-
                                                        
2  JUSTICE POLICY INST., FOR BETTER OR FOR PROFIT: HOW THE BAIL BONDING INDUSTRY 
STANDS IN THE WAY OF FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL JUSTICE 9 (2012). 
3  Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html?_r=0. 
In New York City, where courts use bail far less than in many jurisdictions, roughly 45,000 peo-
ple are jailed each year simply because they can’t pay their court-assigned bail. And while the 
city’s courts set bail much lower than the national average, only one in 10 defendants is able to 
pay it at arraignment. To put a finer point on it: Even when bail is set comparatively low—at 
$500 or less, as it is in one-third of nonfelony cases—only 15 percent of defendants are able to 
come up with the money to avoid jail. 
Id. 
4  See, e.g., Madeline Baro, Texas Sheriff Pleads Guilty, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 10, 1998), 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1998/Texas-Sheriff-Pleads-Guilty/id-
b28f7718500fba4f2db24384133975d3 [https://perma.cc/PS36-5PQE]. 
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ever, pretrial-release programs are not a uniform solution. Nevada should re-
form its bail industry to include an evidence-based pretrial-release program 
providing a defendant a range of options, including commercial bail. 
Part I of this Note details the history of the U.S. bail-bond system and how 
the commercial bail industry earned such a prominent role in pretrial release. 
Part II explains the current condition of Nevada’s commercial bail industry and 
the laws governing Nevada’s bail bondsmen. Part III analyzes the problems 
created by the Nevada commercial bail industry. Part IV showcases two unse-
cured pretrial-release systems presently used by Kentucky and Colorado and 
addresses the criticisms of those systems. Part V offers a recommendation for 
reform of the Nevada bail industry and advocates for the inclusion of an unse-
cured-bond pretrial-release system as a supplement to the current system.  
I. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES BAIL-BOND SYSTEM 
The early origins of the bail-bond system reach all the way back to the 
Roman Empire, but America’s notion of bail derives from one-thousand-year-
old English roots.5 The Anglo-Saxons used bail to predict the results of trial 
and as a means to avoid the many abuses inherent in pretrial imprisonment.6 
The British colonies in America applied traditional English law for criminal 
justice, but it was not long before differences in cultural customs and crime 
rates created the need for more liberal criminal penalties, ultimately restructur-
ing the American bail administration.7 By the summer of 1789, the first U.S. 
Congress passed the Judiciary Act, granting an absolute right to bail for those 
charged with non-capital federal crimes.8 A number of states followed suit, es-
tablishing a right to bail for almost all defendants.9 Thus, the  
[p]rinciples of the early American bail system—set forth in the Judiciary Acts of 
1789 and the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment—were: (1) Bail should not 
be excessive, (2) A right to bail exists in non-capital cases, and (3) Bail is meant 
to assure the appearance of the accused at trial.10  
However, Americans’ favoritism of corporal punishment soon created 
problems within the new system.11 Assigning the appropriate bail amount was 
                                                        
5  TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND 
PRETRIAL RELEASE 1 (2010). 
6  Id. 
7  Id. at 4. 
8  Id. at 5. Section 33 of the Judiciary Act states: 
And upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may 
be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit court, or by a 
justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who shall exercise their discretion 
therein, regarding the nature and circumstances of the offence, and of the evidence, and the us-
ages of law. 
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 33, 1 Stat. 73. 
9  See SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 5, at 4–5. 
10  Id. at 5. 
11  Id. at 6. 
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difficult. “[A]ssigning a monetary equivalent to either corporal punishment or 
imprisonment is largely an arbitrary act.”12 Further, releasing a defendant pre-
trial was hardly considered a viable option, as charges resulting in corporal 
punishment carried a great incentive to flee.13 But as America grew, the crimi-
nal justice system became more robust, and the amount of time between an ac-
cusation and trial increased dramatically.14 Also, contrary to English law, the 
American legal system provided “an absolute right to have bail.”15 Pretrial re-
lease for an accused defendant became an unavoidable option, but determining 
whom to release and for what amount of money was a complex issue.16  
Additionally, the expansive nature of the American frontier frustrated the 
original pretrial-release method.17 First, original pretrial-release included find-
ing a close friend, neighbor, or family member to act as the defendant’s “per-
sonal custodian” while the defendant waited for trial.18 Because of the scattered 
population and poor communication systems, it was exceedingly difficult for 
the judiciary to find suitable personal custodians in frontier America. Second, 
“the vast unsettled American frontier provided a ready sanctuary for any de-
fendant wanting to flee.”19 Under the old system, any defendant released to a 
personal custodian could easily use the expansive wilderness to their benefit. 
As a result, the American judicial system had few choices but to utilize com-
mercial bonds.20 
It is generally believed that the commercial bail-bond industry was a prod-
uct of the Wild West.21 In San Francisco, two brothers, Peter and Thomas 
McDonough, began issuing bail bonds as a favor to lawyers who frequented 
their father’s saloon.22 At this time, lawyers often posted bail for their own cli-
ents by charging extra fees.23 The McDonoughs offered to post bail for the 
lawyers’ clients in exchange for a fee, and once the client made a court appear-
ance, the money was returned.24 The concept of secured bail bonds was born. 
By the late Nineteenth century, the brothers converted their father’s saloon into 
a multi-million dollar business—“the most notorious business house in San 
                                                        
12  Id. 
13  June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Princi-
ples in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 522 (1983). 
14  Id. 
15  WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 11–12 (1976). 
16  See id. at 12. 
17  Shane Bauer, Inside the Wild, Shadowy, and Highly Lucrative Bail Industry, MOTHER 
JONES (June 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/print/248186 [https://perma.cc/Z4YC-
X6FE]. 
18  THOMAS, JR., supra note 15, at 12. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  See SCHNACKE ET. AL., supra note 5, at 7. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  Bauer, supra note 17. 
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Francisco”—underwriting secured bonds for local defendants.25 While this par-
ticular establishment lasted only fifty years, the McDonough’s idea, coupled 
with rapidly increasing bail amounts, allowed the commercial bail bond indus-
try in America to flourish.26 
Opponents of the new system were quick to criticize. By the 1920s, reports 
of excessive bail amounts and the unwieldy power of professional bondsmen 
began to sway the national conversation regarding bail bonds toward the use of 
pretrial release alternatives.27 The commercial bail industry ignored these is-
sues, and by the 1940s, national bail rates had soared, such that “many defend-
ants had no choice but to either pay a bondsman or sit in jail until trial.”28 It 
was clear that what began as an entrepreneurial scheme between two brothers 
had become an “integral part of the criminal[]justice system.”29 
In 1951, the Supreme Court offered its first opinion on the bail-bond insti-
tution.30 Stack v. Boyle involved multiple defendants seeking a reduction of bail 
amounts, claiming that the high rates were excessive under the Eighth Amend-
ment.31 The Court held the bail amounts in question were constitutional and 
upheld the modern bail-bond practice, explaining that bail serves as an addi-
tional assurance of “the presence of that defendant.”32 The Court also empha-
sized the necessity of individual assessments in determining a defendant’s 
bail.33 Four months later, the Court clarified its decision in Carlson v. Landon, 
holding that an accused’s right to freedom before conviction is not absolute, 
because the Eighth Amendment “fails to say all arrests must be bailable.”34 To-
gether, these cases developed the precedent that bail is a fundamental but not 
                                                        
25  Id. (quoting The Old Lady Moves On, TIME (Aug. 18, 1941), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,802159,00.html). The company was 
known as ‘The Old Lady of Kearny Street,’ and lasted only fifty years, but left its legacy in 
the form of the commercial bond industry. Id. Time Magazine reported on the company’s 
closing: 
The Old Lady helped San Francisco be what many a citizen wanted it to be—a wide-open town. 
She furnished bail by the gross to bookmakers and prostitutes, kept a taxi waiting at the door to 
whisk them out of jail and back to work. But she was also a catalyst that brought underworld and 
police department into an inevitably corrupt amalgam . . . . [M]any a citizen thought simply: 
“Good riddance.” 
Id. 
26  SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 5, at 7. 
27  Id. See generally ARTHUR L. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (1927). 
28  Bauer, supra note 17. 
29  Id. 
30  SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 5, at 8. 
31  342 U.S. 1 (1951); SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 5, at 8. 
32  Stack, 342 U.S. at 5. 
33  Id. at 9 (“Each defendant stands before the bar of justice as an individual. Even on a con-
spiracy charge defendants do not lose their separateness or identity.”); SCHNACKE ET AL., su-
pra note 5, at 8–9. 
34  342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952); SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 5, at 9. 
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absolute right.35 But, the court left the state and federal legislatures to adjust the 
parameters of the bail-bond system.36 
Throughout the 1960s, a multitude of studies continued to highlight the 
same faults inherent in the commercial bail-bond system, prompting interest in 
bail reform.37 In 1966, Congress passed the Federal Bail Reform Act, marking 
the first legal revisions to the bail system since 1789.38 Generally, the Act de-
clared non-capital federal defendants “were to be released pending trial on their 
personal recognizance or on ‘personal bonds’ unless the judicial officer deter-
mined that these incentives would not adequately assure their appearance at tri-
al.”39 While states took interest in reforming bail legislation, many continued to 
rely on the commercial industry.40 
With more interest in pretrial release alternatives, many professional organ-
izations, such as the American Bar Association (ABA), designed standards ad-
dressing policy disparities among bail and pretrial-release laws resulting from 
the 1966 reform efforts.41 Specifically, the ABA argued for the abolition of se-
cured bonds, claiming “[t]heir role is neither appropriate nor necessary and the 
recommendation that they be abolished is without qualification.”42  
Since the 1960s, bail reform has slowly incorporated the addition of effec-
tive pretrial services.43 In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act, which included the Bail Reform Act of 1984.44 Part of the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 required the district courts to measure community safety in 
a federal defendant’s pretrial-release assessment.45 “The Act create[d] a rebut-
table presumption toward confinement when the person has committed certain 
delineated offenses, such as crimes of violence or serious drug crimes.”46 This 
preventative detention provision was challenged in United States v. Salerno, 
but the Supreme Court held it did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause or the Eighth Amendment.47 The preventative detention provision 
was constitutional because an individual would only face detention after a de-
tailed analysis indicating he posed a danger to the community, and the govern-
ment has the right to protect the safety of its citizens.48 The Court concluded, 
                                                        
35  SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 5, at 9. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. at 10. 
38  Id. at 12. The act was codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3151. 
39  SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 5, at 12. 
40  See id. 
41  Id. at 13. 
42  AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE 46 (3rd ed. 
2007); SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 5, at 15. 
43  SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 5, at 16. 
44  Id. at 17. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. at 18. 
47  481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
48  Id. 
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“[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial 
is the carefully limited exception.”49  
The novel concept of a pretrial analysis measuring community safety and 
an accused’s risk of failing to appear was quickly adapted, and by 1999, at least 
forty-four states were issuing pretrial-release decisions relying, in part, on those 
factors.50 In 1987, Congress analyzed the Bail Reform Act of 1984’s effect on 
the industry.51 Under the new law, there was a greater number of pretrial de-
tainees than in years prior—51 percent for a lack of bail money and 49 percent 
for danger to public safety.52 But, the overall results were clear: only 1.8 per-
cent of defendants released pretrial failed to return to court, a drop of 0.3 per-
cent from when the prior law controlled.53 More importantly, court officials 
found that implementation of the community-safety analysis made the law 
“more direct and honest.”54 Indeed, as a result of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and Wisconsin passed legislation eliminating the 
commercial-bail industry and adopting some type of unsecured-bond pretrial-
release program.55 
In more recent decades, state legislatures have become the battleground be-
tween the commercial-bail industry and pretrial-services agencies.56 Although 
most states revised bail statutes to include the consideration of community safe-
ty, many of their bail-bond systems remain flawed, as those states have yet to 
“adopt[] a system that calls for the type of careful scrutiny of information about 
the defendant’s background and financial circumstances.”57 Many jurisdictions 
still commonly determine a defendant’s pretrial release with little to no infor-
mation about the defendant’s financial circumstances or potential risk to the 
community.58 Instead, most pretrial release decisions are “hurried initial ap-
pearance proceedings,” where the defendant is frequently without counsel.59 
II. THE CURRENT BAIL INDUSTRY IN NEVADA 
Nevada’s bail-bond statutes are some of the most detailed and comprehen-
sive in America, but they are based on the basic principles of the commercial-
                                                        
49  Id. 
50  SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 5, at 18. 
51  Id. at 19. 
52  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO REP. NO. GGD-88-6, CRIMINAL BAIL: HOW BAIL 
REFORM IS WORKING IN SELECTED DISTRICT COURTS 17 (1987). 
53  Id. at 4. 
54  Id. at 33. 
55  JUSTICE POLICY INST., BAIL REFORM UPDATE, 2013: PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 
REFINED AND EXPANDED THEIR REACH, WHILE THE BAIL INDUSTRY CONTINUED TO FIGHT 
FORFEITURE COLLECTION AND NON-FINANCIAL RELEASE 1 (2013). 
56  See SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 5, at 24. 
57  Id. at 18–19. 
58  Id. at 19. 
59  Id. 
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bail industry.60 A defendant who can post his own bail either pays cash or cred-
it to the court and has the full amount returned upon his court appearance. Gen-
erally, a bail-bond company posts bail for a defendant who cannot pay and as-
sures the court the defendant will appear.61 The defendant signs a contract 
promising the bail-bond company 15 percent of the cost of bail plus administra-
tive fees, and usually provides co-signers and collateral to cover the liability of 
a failure to appear. The defendant is released from custody until trial, and the 
bail is returned to the company once the case is settled, provided the defendant 
appears in court.62 
To receive a bail-agent license in Nevada, one must be a state resident for 
at least one year, be eighteen years old, pass a written exam, file a $25,000 
bond, and complete a six-hour course on the bail-bond industry.63 The qualifi-
cations are similar for a bail-enforcement agent, commonly known as a “bounty 
hunter.” A bounty hunter must be twenty-one years old, have a high school di-
ploma, and pass multiple background and psychological tests.64 Neither a bail 
agent nor bail-enforcement agent may practice the trade if they have prior felo-
ny substance abuse or fraud convictions.65 
Like many states, Nevada permits bail agents to have arrest authority over 
defendants at any time and any place within the state, provided that local law 
enforcement is notified immediately upon making an arrest.66 Nevada bail-bond 
companies claim bounty hunters are rarely utilized, as most enforcement can be 
accomplished with a telephone call to the defendant or his co-signers.67 Unfor-
tunately, the defendant’s co-signers are frequently left liable if the defendant 
leaves town.68 
Under Nevada Revised Statute (N.R.S.) section 697.300, bail bondsmen in 
Nevada must charge 15 percent of the cost of bail or $50, whichever is higher, 
plus administrative fees.69 Although Nevada’s rates are not the highest nation-
wide, they are not the lowest.70 Some states, such as California and Michigan, 
cap bail costs at 10 percent, while Washington and Alaska place no limits on 
                                                        
60  Nevada Bail Law, BAIL LAWS (2016), http://www.baillaws.com/laws/Nevada 
[https://perma.cc/62AA-QX8F]; see also F. Andrew Taylor, Bail Bondsmen Sometimes Get 
Bad Rap, L.V. REV.-J. (July 15, 2014), http://www.reviewjournal.com/life/public-safety/bail-
bondsmen-sometimes-get-bad-rap [https://perma.cc/KYL6-EL3R]. 
61  Taylor, supra note 60. 
62  Id. 
63  NEV. REV. STAT. § 697.150 (2013); Nevada Bail Law, supra note 60. 
64  NEV. REV. STAT. § 697.173. 
65  § 697.150(2); § 697.173(2). 
66  § 178.526; § 697.325. 
67  Taylor, supra note 60. 
68  Id. 
69  How Much Does Bail Cost?, ABOUTBAIL, http://www.aboutbail.com/pages/bail-cost 
[https://perma.cc/9MZC-4U2Z] (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
70  See generally id. 
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the cost of bail.71 In Clark County, Nevada, the Justice Court uses a fee sched-
ule to serve as a reference point for judges setting bail in criminal cases.72 The 
schedule sets bail by categorizing individual offenses as identified by the Ne-
vada Revised Statutes.73 
There is no standard bail for certain crimes.74 The category A felonies of 
murder, sexual assault, first-degree kidnapping, and high level trafficking of a 
controlled substance, as well as the category B felonies of attempted murder 
and DUI resulting in substantial bodily harm, all receive “set in court” bail 
amounts.75 When a defendant is charged with any of these felonies, the judge 
will consider the parties’ arguments when setting bail.76  
All other category B felonies have a standard bail of $20,000 per count.77 
Category C felonies have a standard bail of $5,000,78 with the exception of bat-
tery/domestic violence resulting in substantial bodily harm, which has a stand-
ard bail of $15,000.79 Category D and E felonies have a standard bail of 
$3,000.80 Gross misdemeanors and typical misdemeanors have standard bail 
amounts of $2,000 and $1,000, respectively.81 Again, exceptions exist for bat-
tery/domestic violence ($3,000) and driving under the influence ($2,000), both 
with elevated bail rates of $5,000 for second offenses.82 
Moreover, Nevada imposes additional bail amounts for statutory crime en-
hancements, as set by Nevada Revised Statutes.83 These enhancements include 
crimes involving school property, crimes using the assistance of a child, crimes 
using a handgun containing metal-penetrating bullets, any offenses involving 
the use of a deadly weapon, the violation of a protection order, crimes where a 
victim is sixty years of age or older, hate crimes, and crimes furthering the ef-
forts of a gang.84 If a crime is “enhanced,” the bail is double the standard 
amount, unless one of the enhancements is an element of the crime.85  
                                                        
71  Id. 
72  Hofland & Tomsheck, Las Vegas Justic Court Issues Newly Revised Standard Bail 
Schedule, L.V. CRIMINAL ATT’Y BLOG (May 21, 2015), http://www.lasvegascriminalattor 
neyblog.com/2015/05/21/70/ [https://perma.cc/3ZVD-GMLP]. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  JUSTICE COURT, LAS VEGAS TOWNSHIP STANDARD BAIL SCHEDULE (May 26, 2015), 
https://www.clarkcountybar.org/wp-content/uploads/lvjcsbs15.pdf [https://perma.cc/228C-
JYQX]. 
76  Hofland & Tomsheck, supra note 72. 
77  JUSTICE COURT, supra note 75. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
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III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT NEVADA BAIL-BOND SYSTEM 
The commercialization of the bail bond industry is extremely profitable. As 
such, the bail industry “discriminates against the poor and places Americans’ 
liberty at the mercy of private businesses.”86 When bail amounts were reasona-
ble, a defendant would either front the money himself or seek help from family 
and friends to pay the court. The defendant’s money was returned upon his ap-
pearance in court. However, as the cost of posting bail increased, paying alone 
was simply not feasible. The commercial bail-bond industry stepped in—much 
like the payday-loan industry—to provide indigent people with quick money.87  
Under the current structure of the commercial bail-bond system, the fees a 
defendant pays to a bail bondsman are nonrefundable.88 Thus, those accused of 
a crime, innocent and guilty alike, are literally paying for freedom.89 Remem-
ber, even today, a defendant capable of paying for bail independently has his 
funds returned after appearing in court. A family that must seek assistance from 
a commercial-bail agent may have to fully commit all assets and resources to 
obtain bail for a defendant.90 That family now lacks the resources to hire a law-
yer and is dependent upon the county’s already overworked public-defender 
system to provide representation. Hence, the commercial-bail industry decreas-
es the likelihood a defendant hires a lawyer or forces the defendant to choose 
between hiring a lawyer and posting bail. 
Advocates of the commercial-bail industry justify the retention of the 15 
percent fee as “compensation for the risks [bondsmen] take and costs they ac-
crue.”91 However, the purported risk is not as precarious as it may seem. A 
commercial bail agent requires the defendant and/or his co-signers to sign a 
contract, legally obligating payment for the defendant’s failure to appear.92 
Therefore, a defendant’s failure to appear rarely affects the bondsman.93 Al-
though the court can initiate proceedings to exact the bail amount from the 
bondsman, it is often the defendant’s co-signers who pay the forfeited 
amount.94 And, if those co-signers are unable to pay, the bondsman can legally 
seize and liquidate any collateral used to secure the bond, such as a house or 
other property.95 
Another problem with Nevada’s current system is that an increase in the 
number of those accused who cannot pay for bail perpetuates costly jail over-
                                                        
86  Bauer, supra note 17. 
87  JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 2, at 12. 
88  Id. at 13. 
89  See id. 
90  Id. at 15. 
91  NEV. REV. STAT. § 697.300 (2013); JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 2, at 13. 
92  JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 2, at 13. 
93  Id. at 15. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. 
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crowding.96 For example, across the country, 75 percent of pretrial detainees 
charged with minor crimes are jailed due to an inability to pay for bail.97 In Ne-
vada, property crimes account for about 80 percent of crimes committed.98 Bail 
amounts for these crimes can be high, while the correlating sentences are likely 
to be low. Therefore, many of these detainees will spend more time in jail pre-
trial than after a potential conviction, thus substantially contributing to the 
problem of overcrowding.99  
Nevada’s jails suffer from overcrowding, with the jail population reaching 
“an all-time high” in 2014.100 In 2014, Nevada’s incarceration rates were 13 
percent higher than the national average.101 When a jail’s overcrowding reaches 
maximum levels, it becomes an emergency situation.102 A jail experiencing 
such a condition is forced to release defendants—including those detained pre-
trial.103 For example, in June 2015 the Clark County Detention Center released 
105 inmates due to overcrowding conditions.104 Although the Detention Center 
selectively released low-risk inmates, a system prone to overcrowding is not 
sustainable long term.105 Further, releasing inmates under such emergency con-
ditions contradicts a defendant’s need to take the justice system seriously. 
Thus, the commercial bail industry invites jail overcrowding, a condition which 
undermines the justice system as a whole. 
Further, pretrial detention adversely impacts the resolution of an accused’s 
criminal case. Defendants who are detained prior to trial are three times more 
likely to be convicted than those defendants charged with the same crime who 
are released pretrial.106 The correlation between incarceration pretrial and sub-
                                                        
96  See KATE LIND, SHOULD WISCONSIN ALLOW COMMERCIAL BAIL IN PRETRIAL RELEASE?, 
26 WPRI REP. (Mar. 2013), http://www.wpri.org/WPRI/Reports/2013/Should-Wisconsin-
Allow-Commerical-Bail-in-Pretrial-Release.htm [https://perma.cc/MJ4D-EJDP]; see also 
Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 935 (2013); Carri Geer Thevenot, ACLU Criticizes Ne-
vada’s Prisons in Report, L.V. REV.-J. (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.reviewjournal.com/ne 
ws/nevada-and-west/aclu-criticizes-nevadas-prisons-report [https://perma.cc/QQ4D-HMUJ]. 
97  Jones, supra note 96. 
98  Nevada, NAT’L INST. CORRECTIONS, http://nicic.gov/statestats/?st=NV [https://perma.cc/ 
AXP6-75M4] (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
99  Jones, supra note 96, at 935–36. 
100  Cassandra Taloma, Metro Seeks Federal Help to Cut Back on Inmate Overcrowding, 
L.V. REV.-J. (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/metro-seeks-
federal-help-cut-back-inmate-overcrowding [https://perma.cc/TL9E-VJXA]. 
101  Nevada, supra note 98. 
102  LIND, supra note 96. See generally Taloma, supra note 100. 
103  LIND, supra note 96. 
104  CCDC Releases Inmates Due to Overcrowding, LASVEGASNOW.COM (June 28, 2015), 
http://www.lasvegasnow.com/news/ccdc-releases-inmates-due-to-overcrowding 
[https://perma.cc/J5HA-X3G9]. 
105  Id. The released inmates were people who were not originally sentenced to jail but who 
failed to pay fines or attend court-ordered classes or community service. Id. 
106  Bauer, supra note 17 (emphasis added); see also LOWENKAMP ET AL., INVESTIGATING THE 
IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES 3 (2013). 
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sequent conviction is so high, that it is almost “tantamount to a decision to con-
vict.”107 Two factors are the majority contributors to this disparity. First, those 
accused of crimes who must remain incarcerated pretrial, experience more dif-
ficulty planning a proper defense.108 Defendants in pretrial detention are “hand-
icapped in consulting with counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses, and 
preparing a defense.”109 
 Second, pretrial detention increases the likelihood defendants will plead 
guilty, as they are desperate to get out of jail.110 One study estimates that, when 
detained pretrial, up to 50 percent of innocent defendants pled guilty to avoid a 
potential maximum sentence.111 Defendants held pretrial also tend to receive 
more unfavorable plea deals from prosecutors.112 Additionally, these plea deals 
have “devastating collateral consequences” on an innocent defendant’s life.113 
The defendant receives a criminal record that will “hinder the individual’s job 
prospects, bar the individual from receiving public housing, and also potentially 
cloud a judge’s perception of the individual if they are arrested again.”114  
Moreover, pretrial detention has deleterious effects on an accused’s per-
sonal life. Inmates can lose their jobs or housing when detained for a failure to 
post bail.115 A defendant who cannot make bail is likely already experiencing 
financial hardship. The defendant’s detention will impose further financial 
hardship on those dependent on his income. A detained defendant’s dependents 
may have to find alternative accommodations, in some cases necessitating a 
drastic life change.116 Above all, a detained defendant’s personal, professional, 
and family relationships are strained.117 Although the commercial industry op-
erates at no direct cost to taxpayers, social costs are high when a defendant’s 
family loses its main source of income and housing. 
Additionally, the length of time a defendant is detained directly correlates 
to the likelihood he will commit another crime.118 For example, low-risk de-
fendants detained even a few days are 40 percent more likely to commit other 
crimes before trial than equally low-risk defendants held for less than twenty-
                                                        
107  Jones, supra note 96, at 936. 
108  Id. at 938; Bauer, supra note 17. 
109  Jones, supra note 96, at 938 (quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
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four hours.119 And, commercial bail bonds provide no disincentive to prevent 
defendants released after a short detention from committing crimes while out 
on bail, because a defendant’s re-arrest does not cause the forfeiture of their 
bail.120 Thus, pretrial detention not only negatively affects an accused’s person-
al life, but does nothing to prevent additional criminal activity.  
The commercial bail bond industry is under no obligation to provide a 
bond to anyone, and it frequently denies posting bonds for a defendant that is 
indigent.121 Generally, bail bondsmen are not willing to post a bond resulting in 
a low fee, as it is not worth the trouble and potential liability if the accused 
skips town.122 Thus, a defendant who cannot afford to pay a $2,000 bond runs a 
high risk of remaining behind bars pretrial simply because a bail bondsman 
does not deem a few hundred dollars profit worth the hassle or liability of 
providing his service.123 Further, bail bondsmen always have the option of re-
fusing to provide bail without reason. If a bondsman feels an accused is a po-
tential flight risk or is unable to pay, chances are the accused’s request for bail 
will be denied. Nevada bail bondsmen are guilty of providing bail in such a 
subjective manner. A manager of a Las Vegas bail-bond agency claims, “I’m 
not going to do a bond for $5,000 for someone who’s unemployed. If they miss 
court, then they don’t have any funds to collect.”124 Thus, Nevada’s current 
commercial bail-bond industry promotes keeping low-risk indigent defendants 
behind bars for the simple inability to pay.  
 In Nevada, like other states with a commercial bail-bond industry, the po-
tential for bondsmen to abuse the system is high. Although it is not a common 
occurrence, bail bondsmen will break the law to ensure a defendant’s pay-
ment.125 Bail corruption generally involves “the illegal bribing of justice offi-
cials and personnel, the coercion of bonded clients to engage in criminal activi-
ties or provide sex to the bondsman, or brutal and terroristic tactics used to 
extort clients’ friends and family.”126 The relationship between a bondsman and 
a defendant is “toxic” by nature, as the bondsman is vested with “coercive po-
lice powers not possessed by private citizens.”127 
Legally, a bail bondsman may actively search for a defendant who has 
failed to appear in court. Sometimes, the bondsman hires a bounty hunter or a 
bail-recovery agent to find a defendant who may have fled the jurisdiction. Al-
                                                        
119  Id. 
120  JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 2, at 19. 
121  Id. at 15; Petrossian, supra note 113, at 2020. 
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though Nevada law requires bounty hunters to register with the state and re-
ceive minimal training, such requirements do not prevent the bounty hunter 
from vigorously  pursuing a defendant.128 Bounty hunters may take a person 
into custody and venture onto private property without first seeking police 
permission.129 Allowing such behavior, typical of the “Wild West,” invites bail 
bondsmen and bounty hunters to behave illegally.  
 For example, in Las Vegas, Nevada around May 2013, two bail bondsmen 
were arrested and accused of assaulting and extorting money and property from 
clients.130 The bondsmen would enter into a bail agreement with female clients 
but then charge their credit cards or take money from their deposit accounts 
without permission.131 The bail bondsmen would also kidnap the women to ex-
tort money and personal property.132 In total, the bail bondsmen were charged 
with twenty-four felonies, including kidnapping, robbery with use of a deadly 
weapon, assault, home invasion, and grand larceny.133 Even if these violations 
are rare occurrences, the Nevada bail-bond industry is a breeding ground for 
illegal activity. Defendants who use the system out of desperation to make bail 
should not be subjected to the threats and assaults of their bail bondsmen. 
Similarly, a California bail-bond business owner pled guilty to multiple 
felony counts for illegally soliciting business from the Orange County jail sys-
tem.134 The bond owner paid an inmate to find others in custody who required 
bail and recommend the bondsman’s services.135 In another example, Texas 
bail agents were caught paying “kickbacks” to law-enforcement officers in 
Starr County.136 Shockingly, the bail agents paid police officers and jail offi-
cials for bond referrals.137 Actions like these diminish the integrity of the com-
mercial bail-bond system by portraying those in positions to help a defendant as 
unethical and easily corruptible. 
                                                        
128  See generally Training for Bounty Hunter Jobs in Nevada, BOUNTYHUNTEREDU.ORG, 
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IV. OTHER STATES’ METHODS OF PRETRIAL-RELEASE REFORM 
Almost all states provide for some type of pretrial-release, either on per-
sonal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond.138 Four states—
Kentucky, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Oregon—have completely eliminated com-
mercial bail-bonding, while the majority of other states incorporate some form 
of non-monetary or unsecured bail-bonding into pretrial-release programs.139 
An unsecured-bond pretrial-release program provides for a defendant’s release 
without financial conditions and is generally run by a state’s county justice sys-
tem. At the core of an unsecured-bond program are pretrial-release assess-
ments, a mechanism used to ensure a defendant’s pretrial release does not im-
pair a court appearance or the safety of victims, witnesses, and the public.140 
After the rigorous assessment, the pretrial-program officers release a recom-
mendation, listing a continuum of available release options specific to the de-
fendant.141 Analyzed below are Kentucky’s completely unsecured bail-bond 
industry, Colorado’s “combination” bail industry, and general criticisms of the 
unsecured bail-bond industry. 
A. Kentucky 
The Justice Policy Institute recognized Kentucky’s nonprofit bail-bonding 
institution as a “prime example of how states can achieve, maintain and im-
prove pretrial outcomes.”142 Outlawing the commercial bail bond system in 
1976, Kentucky was one of the first states to create an unsecured bail-bond in-
dustry.143 The Kentucky Pretrial Services Agency is funded by the court system 
and available to all counties.144 However, even with an unsecured bond indus-
try, Kentucky still suffered an inmate population increase of 45 percent from 
2000 to 2009.145 The dramatic increase was estimated to cost the state $161 
million by 2020 and devastate the holding capacity of the state’s prisons.146 
The answer to Kentucky’s problem was House Bill (H.B.) 463, designed to 
decrease the number of locally incarcerated defendants awaiting trial, thus in-
creasing jail capacity and decreasing the societal cost of high incarceration 
rates.147 H.B. 463, or the Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act, re-
quired Pretrial Services to use a “research-based, validated assessment tool to 
                                                        
138  AMBER WIDGERY, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, PRETRIAL RELEASE 
CONDITIONS (2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-release-
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measure a defendant’s flight risk and public dangerousness.”148 Following the 
passage of the Act, a judge’s bond decision must consider the pretrial risk as-
sessment, provide increased information about the defendant to the decision 
process, and preserve issues for appeal.149 
Further, the Act streamlined Kentucky’s pretrial risk assessment pro-
gram.150 Under the program, a defendant must come before a judge within 
twenty-four hours of arrest for bond determination, excluding arrests for capital 
offenses.151 The judge determines the bond amount starting with a presumption 
that every defendant should be released on his own recognizance.152 The judge 
then assigns release conditions after considering “whether the defendant consti-
tutes a flight risk, is unlikely to appear for trial, or is likely to be a danger to the 
public if released.”153  
This information is collected beforehand through a short interviews and in-
vestigations and includes, “the defendant’s residency history, work status, cur-
rent charge, legal status, any substance abuse history, any prior misdemeanor or 
felony convictions, any prior violent crime convictions, any prior failures to 
appear, mental health history, and any prior escape convictions.”154 Each cate-
gory is assigned a point value. The total determines if a defendant is a low, 
moderate, or high risk for flight or public danger. 155 Generally, a low or mod-
erate-risk defendant is released on his own recognizance, with pretrial supervi-
sion conditions for the latter.156 A high-risk defendant’s bail is left to the discre-
tion of the judge; the judge may elect to reject the assessment and offer her own 
bail decision.157  
In the years following H.B. 463, Kentucky experienced relatively positive 
results.158 The appearance rate of defendants and the public safety rate both in-
creased 1 percent.159 The number of low- and moderate-risk defendants re-
leased also increased, up 7 percent and 8 percent, respectively.160 Reassuringly, 
the number of high-risk defendants released has remained about the same, indi-
cating that the Bill’s assessment program effectively detains the appropriate de-
fendants.161 Therefore, it appears the Bill’s purpose is being achieved, as more 
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detainees are released, returning to court, and committing fewer crimes while 
on release.162  
Yet, this system is not without its critics. The majority of objections to 
H.B. 463 involve the judge’s discretion to disregard the risk assessment and 
subjectively evaluate the defendant’s risk.163 Allegedly, judges have allowed 
this exception to “swallow the objective rule.”164 As a result, claims of “signifi-
cant disparity in bond determinations” stem from the erratic use of this excep-
tion.165 Studies measuring the post-legislation effect on release rates and public 
safety show that pretrial-release rates have increased unevenly throughout the 
state.166 Therefore, the Bill’s subjective exception should be clarified and 
reevaluated to prevent this disparity.167  
Further, critics point to the confusing nature of the bond-decision proce-
dure.168 Apparently, some risk-assessment factors overlap and can be consid-
ered both subjectively and objectively, allowing for potential biases to influ-
ence the entire process.169 Thus, the “wide scope of the subjective exception” 
can hinder the statistically-neutral risk assessment and obstruct H.B. 463’s pre-
trial program goals.170  
Despite complaints surrounding some of H.B. 463, proof of the plan’s ef-
fectiveness is in the results. Kentucky’s unsecured-bond pretrial-release pro-
gram costs the state less money and works to reduce the likelihood of a defend-
ant’s failure to appear, while ensuring public safety. The program ensures 
defendants are only detained pretrial when necessary and serves as a model ex-
ample for other states. 
B. Colorado  
In 2013, the Colorado legislature passed House Bill (H.B.) 13-1236, de-
signed to overhaul the state’s pretrial-release program.171 The Bill was designed 
to decrease the use of financial bonds and “[e]xpand and [i]mprove [p]retrial 
[a]pproaches and [o]pportunities.”172 Colorado’s statutes still require financial 
conditions for some types of pretrial release, but H.B. 13-1236 implements 
mandatory provisions for judges to consider when determining if a bond should 
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be secured or unsecured.173 H.B. 13-1236 created two types of unsecured 
bonds: personal-recognizance bonds with either statutorily-mandated condi-
tions or additional non-monetary conditions.174 Similar to Kentucky, when a 
defendant is booked into jail, he will have the opportunity for release within 
two days.175 Judges are instructed to presume the defendant’s release under the 
least-restrictive bail conditions, excluding statutory exceptions, and then exam-
ine certain factors (discussed below) to determine the appropriate type of 
bond.176 
Following this directive, a few Colorado counties created the Colorado 
Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT).177 Using the CPAT, these counties collect 
and analyze evidence through interview and investigation to determine a de-
fendant’s pretrial-release risk.178 The Pretrial Justice Institute verified the 
CPAT’s analysis for accuracy.179 CPAT then creates an individualized pretrial-
release recommendation for the judge’s consideration when setting a bond.180 
H.B. 13-1236 enumerated the pretrial factors for analysis: the defendant’s pos-
session of a home or cellphone; ownership or rental of a residence; contribution 
to residential payments; past or current problems with alcohol; past or current 
mental health treatment; age at first arrest; past jail or prison sentences; active 
warrants; other pending cases; current supervision requirements; and history of 
revoked bond or supervision.181 The CPAT determines how to score and weigh 
these factors for bond-condition recommendations.182 
Studies following Colorado’s pretrial reform showed that Colorado juris-
dictions still used secured money bonds for 69 percent of defendants’ pretrial 
releases.183 Although it may be too soon to see definitive results, one study 
showed the potential for a dramatic increase in the use of unsecured bonds.184 
In Colorado, a defendant’s release on an unsecured bond achieved the same or 
better results regarding public safety as secured bonds.185 Also, the use of se-
cured monetary over unsecured bonds failed to increase a defendant’s court ap-
pearance.186 Most importantly, the use of unsecured bonds frees substantial jail 
resources, as unsecured bonds allow for a defendant’s release, usually quick-
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ly.187 Accordingly, if Colorado increased the number of defendants released 
pretrial on unsecured bonds, the state could maintain public safety and a de-
fendant’s likelihood of a court appearance, while preserving jail resources.  
Indeed, it appears the CPAT is already working effectively to ensure de-
fendants are not detained pretrial unnecessarily, without disregarding common 
sense when a defendant poses too big a safety risk for release. For example, a 
woman charged with attempting to poison her children was held on a $300,000 
bond despite attempts from her public defender to secure a personal-
recognizance bond.188 Under the CPAT, the defendant was not a flight risk and 
had a 95 percent chance of returning to court.189 Yet, the judge chose to reject 
the pretrial-risk assessment, stating the potential severity of the defendant’s 
sentence would create an incentive to flee.190 Additionally, the judge felt the 
defendant’s mental health made her a danger to herself and community.191 
Thus, the Colorado judicial system is capable of correctly recognizing when a 
CPAT pretrial analysis should be a persuasive factor in pretrial-release deci-
sions and when a defendant’s release is too risky. 
C. General Criticism of Pretrial Release Programs Using Unsecured Bonds 
A pretrial release program will be ineffective unless it is carefully con-
structed to improve a specific county’s bail system. For example, the First Judi-
cial District of Pennsylvania recently considered returning to the use of com-
mercial bail bonds after multiple complaints that the bail system was 
“broken.”192 The district implemented a combination secured/unsecured pretrial 
bail system in the 1970s, where defendants would pay an initial 10 percent de-
posit of their total bail and agree to owe the remaining amount for a failure to 
appear in court.193 State officials admit to poorly managing the system, as by 
2008, approximately 19,000 defendants had failed to appear each year, and the 
estimated cost of uncollected forfeited bail totaled one billion dollars.194 Critics 
point out that the Philadelphia bail program allowed defendants to “ ‘defeat the 
system’ by failing to show up for court, wearing down witnesses and causing 
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cases to collapse in large numbers each year.”195 Philadelphia’s inability to 
manage its faulty pretrial-release plan shows that a state-run “10 percent depos-
it bail” program is not an effective pretrial-release method.196 
But, Philadelphia’s bail program deteriorated for a few reasons. The city 
failed to collect forfeited bail; to determine if defendants could afford to pay 
forfeited bail; and to keep records of bail debt.197 Philadelphia’s District Attor-
ney claimed the city’s Clerk of Quarter Sessions Office was “so ineffective [in 
keeping adequate bail records] . . . that it ‘contributes to the fugitive crisis in-
stead of alleviating it.’ ”198 Thus, it appears a break down in the city’s manage-
ment and administration of the unsecured pretrial-release program is to blame. 
 Proponents of pure commercial bail argue the system is the only way to 
achieve the lowest failure-to-appear rates. According to a study published in the 
Journal of Law and Economics in 2004, commercial bail provides a 28 percent 
lower failure-to-appear rate than a defendant released on his own recogni-
zance.199 The same report concluded a defendant is less likely to commit new 
crimes while released pretrial on commercial bail.200 Apparently, the structure 
of the commercial bail program inherently provides a stronger incentive for 
those issuing bail bonds to ensure a defendant appears in court.201 
A commercial bail agent’s desire for profit is an incentive that “aligns [his] 
interest[] with those of the courts and the public.”202 To avoid the costly ex-
pense of a defendant’s bail forfeiture, a commercial bondsman will make a 
concerted effort to ensure a defendant appears in court; such an effort usually 
requires the bondman to impose special conditions on a defendant released on 
bail, such as monitoring or regular check-ins.203 These conditions reduce the 
likelihood a defendant will flee and generally involve regular electronic or 
physical contact.204 Additionally, the agents collect detailed personal infor-
mation from the defendant and his co-signers in order to ensure a court appear-
ance or a high probability of re-arrest.205 
Further, because a defendant becomes liable to a bondsman upon a failure 
to appear in court, commercial bail agents hold the defendant’s co-signers lia-
ble and seize the defendant’s collateral to ensure a court appearance.206 The bail 
agents essentially create a network or “circle of responsibility” of people who 
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also have a vested interest in guaranteeing the defendant appears.207 The net-
work’s effectiveness is offered as one reason secured bail bonds provide con-
sistently lower failure-to-appear rates than other unsecured methods.208  
Lastly, advocates for the commercial bail industry claim the amount of 
time and resources bail agents dedicate to comprising and enforcing commer-
cial surety bonds allows for a more efficient system. Heavy caseloads frequent-
ly slow the judicial system, and management of a county’s bail industry adds 
more work to an already exhausted system.209 Similarly, commercial bail 
agents have reserved time and resources to handle those defendants who flee.210 
Law enforcement officials, with ever-strained resources, often have higher pri-
orities than chasing after a defendant who fails to appear. Thus, the nature of 
the commercial bail system allows bail agents to fine-tune their skills in provid-
ing bail and ensuring a defendant’s appearance.  
Indeed, statistics show the commercial bail industry is effective. The indus-
try’s success rate is alleged to be 98 percent, as only eight out of every one 
hundred defendants released on a surety bond will skip bail, and all but two 
will be recovered.211 Additionally, the industry offers reduced costs to taxpay-
ers and the criminal justice system as a whole. The cost of a defendant’s single 
failure to appear is estimated at $1,775.212 Commercial bail bondsmen require 
no additional cost to taxpayers, while preventing costs related to a defendant’s 
failure to appear.  
Although the commercial bail industry is a system well-entrenched in the 
American judicial process, it is a result of tradition rather than efficiency. 
While statistics appear to plead a convincing case for continuing the industry, 
data on alternative pretrial-release programs show they are preferable to tradi-
tional bail systems. New pretrial-release alternatives are not always a perfect 
solution, but the programs may offer the same results with less collateral dam-
age. The idea of bail bonds and bounty hunters may be a fond American con-
cept, but unsecured-bond pretrial-release programs are a promising concept for 
the future. 
V. NEVADA SHOULD ADOPT UNSECURED BOND PRETRIAL-RELEASE 
METHODS 
Nevada can use unsecured bonds for pretrial release to maximize defend-
ants’ court appearance rates while minimizing the use of state and county re-
sources. To effect such a change, Nevada should implement a pretrial-release 
program similar to Colorado’s combination system. Complete reform of the 
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Nevada bail industry would be a drastic change and likely have unpredictable 
results. Nevada should integrate an unsecured-bond pretrial-release program 
into the existing commercial bail industry, with the goal of reducing the num-
ber of defendants detained for failure to post a cash bond. For best results, Ne-
vada ought to adopt a verified evidence-based pretrial-assessment system, 
which allows a court to accurately rate a defendant’s risk factor and recom-
mend a secured or unsecured bond accordingly. Such a system would necessi-
tate the creation of a Pretrial Services Program, with the state’s district courts 
charged with oversight. Like Colorado and Kentucky, the Pretrial Services Pro-
gram would interview and analyze the defendant and rank his risk type. The 
judge would consider this analysis upon determining bail, beginning with the 
presumption of pretrial release. With the addition of two types of unsecured 
bonds—those with either statutorily-mandated or additional conditions—
Nevada should be able to maintain public safety, while reserving more jail beds 
for “unmanageably high risk defendants and sentenced offenders.”213 
Implementing an unsecured pretrial release program would have dramatic 
effects on the Nevada criminal-justice community. First, the state would stop 
placing low-risk defendants behind bars simply because of an inability to pay 
bail. Releasing low-risk defendants on an unsecured bond would save both de-
fendant and county resources. Defendants from low-income families would be 
able to return home and continue to provide income and a sense of stability. 
Families of indigent defendants could pool resources to hire a defense attorney, 
instead of breaking the bank to post bail. These two consequences alone would 
have a positive impact on Nevada’s indigent community and could reduce the 
number of people affected by the detention of a primary-income family mem-
ber. 
Nevada counties receive a monetary benefit from the addition of a pretrial-
release program as well. With fewer defendants detained, county jails would 
require fewer resources and cost the county less money. Nevada taxpayers also 
receive a break. Currently, Nevadans pay an average of $20,656 per inmate,214 
a number likely to experience a steep decline once the majority of low-risk de-
fendants currently occupying jail beds are released on unsecured bonds. The 
state with the lowest cost per inmate is Kentucky—one of the original four 
states to outlaw the commercial bail industry.215 
As previously stated, Nevada has frequently battled the problem of jail 
overcrowding. Using the statistics from Colorado and Kentucky as guideposts 
and considering that 80 percent of Nevada’s crime would most likely place a 
defendant in a low-risk category, it appears Nevada could reduce jail over-
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crowding with an unsecured-bond pretrial-release program.216 Even if secured 
bond amounts are low, an unsecured-bond program allows for the release of 
more defendants. More defendants released pretrial means fewer resources are 
utilized housing multitudes of defendants whose release simply hinges on mon-
ey. Such a program would reserve jail beds for those who truly deserve to be 
behind bars. 
Further, there will always be an indigent defendant who cannot pay. Neva-
da’s jail overcrowding problem is likely exacerbated by bail bondsmen who re-
fuse to post a bond for a defendant who is perceived as a flight risk, unable to 
pay, or requires a nominal bond.217 Such defendants are out of luck and must 
wait in jail to defend their innocence, while consuming the city’s or county’s 
resources. An unsecured-bond pretrial-release program reduces the number of 
pretrial detainees and prevents a bondsman’s arbitrary decision from condemn-
ing a defendant to pretrial detention. Another benefit to detaining fewer de-
fendants pretrial is the reduction in the amount of defendants who may be in-
fluenced by their time behind bars to commit more crime. Statistics show that a 
defendant jailed for even a few days pretrial is likely to commit additional 
crimes once released. A defendant surrounded by criminals can easily become a 
product of his surroundings. Conversely, a defendant released on an unsecured 
bond can have the support of his family and friends until his court appearance. 
Therefore, unsecured-bond pretrial-release program not only gives Nevada the 
chance to decrease jail overcrowding, but also potentially decrease the amount 
of crime. 
To be sure, the most concerning issue about supplementing the commercial 
bail industry with an unsecured-bond pretrial-release program is the effect on 
public safety. However, Colorado’s implementation of unsecured-bond pretrial 
release created public-safety results consistent with the status quo. Considering 
that Nevada is a regional neighbor to Colorado, it is probable Nevada would 
experience similar results in public safety ratings if the state chose to add an 
unsecured-bond pretrial-release program. Although it may be disconcerting to 
imagine defendants accused of crimes roaming the streets without any type of 
security, such a vivid daydream is unrealistic. At the core of an unsecured-bond 
pretrial-release program is an evidence-based analysis, which uses information 
obtained from multiple sources to produce a score indicative of a defendant’s 
flight risk and danger to the community. Through this analysis, the program in-
herently accounts for defendants who pose a threat to public safety and pre-
vents their release on unsecured bond. Moreover, a defendant’s pretrial analysis 
is but one factor in a judge’s decision to release a defendant on an unsecured 
bond. When considered in totality, the conscious design of an unsecured-bond 
pretrial-release program and its resulting effect on public safety weighs in favor 
of implementing the program.  
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Tantamount to public safety is the issue of ensuring a defendant appears in 
court. Similar to its effects on ratings of public safety, implementing unsecured 
pretrial-release bonds maintains or even increases a defendant’s likelihood of 
appearing in court. In the Colorado study, the use of either bond affected simi-
lar results because both bonds potentially cost the defendant money for failing 
to appear. If Nevada were to implement an unsecured-bond pretrial-release 
program, it is likely the state would experience the same outcome.  
Although comparable results between secured and unsecured bonds may 
appear to weigh in favor of continuing with the secured bond industry, this is 
not so. It is precisely because unsecured bonds affect the same result as secured 
bonds, that Nevada should consider including unsecured bonds in its pretrial-
release program. An unsecured-bond pretrial-release program provides a safer 
and more stable alternative to the commercial bail-bond industry, while main-
taining and potentially improving public safety and defendants’ rate of appear-
ance. 
Lastly, an unsecured-bond pretrial-release program in Nevada would re-
duce the amount of illegal activity prevalent in the commercial bail-bond indus-
try. Stories like the ones discussed above218 about vigilante bondsmen and 
bounty hunters taking the law into their own hands are a potentially dangerous 
element of the commercial bail industry. Providing indigent low-risk defend-
ants with pretrial release through unsecured bonds spells an end to manipula-
tive bondsmen preying on those who cannot pay. With both secured and unse-
cured bonds resulting in the same rate of appearance, the specialized 
monitoring services that bondsmen claim are unique to the profession appear to 
be not so exclusive after all. 
Implementation of an unsecured-bond pretrial-release program would be 
fairly simple for Nevada. In implementing its program, Colorado passed new 
statutes governing bail procedures. Nevada already uses a type of pretrial-
release analysis to determine a defendant’s release method. A defendant 
charged with a misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or non-violent felony is to be 
released on his own recognizance, per the state district court’s decision.219 Un-
der a release on his own recognizance, a defendant is freed on an unsecured 
bond, usually with several conditions; N.R.S. section 178.4853 lists the factors 
courts must consider in analyzing a defendant’s ability to be released on his 
own recognizance.220  
If Nevada chose to adopt an unsecured-bond pretrial-release component to 
the state’s bail industry, the state should consider N.R.S. section 178.4853 as a 
guide. Nevada courts have used the statute since 1981 to aid in analyzing a de-
fendant’s eligibility for pretrial release.221 The N.R.S. section 178.4853 factors 
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are almost an exact match to those used in the pretrial-release program in Colo-
rado. Colorado’s pretrial-release program—the same program Nevada should 
implement—expands on this simple system. Under the new unsecured-bond 
pretrial-release program, Nevada courts would implement their own “Nevada 
Pretrial Assessment Tool,” to provide individualized pretrial-release recom-
mendations for a judge setting a bond. Most importantly, a judge would begin 
each defendant’s pretrial-release analysis with the presumption of release on an 
unsecured bond. With the Nevada Pretrial Assessment Tool, each defendant 
would be analyzed for pretrial-release, regardless of the type of crime they 
committed. Even if a defendant’s recommendation ultimately does not involve 
a type of unsecured-bond pretrial-release, this individual analysis will still al-
low defendants to receive more appropriate secured bonds.  
With careful oversight of this system, Nevada can avoid pitfalls experi-
enced by previous states which have implemented unsecured-bond pretrial-
release programs. Unlike in Philadelphia, Nevada will have to take measures to 
ensure that all forfeited bail is collected and carefully monitor the program’s 
financial impact on the state’s resources. Also, the state will have to oversee the 
court’s administration of the Nevada Pretrial Assessment Tool and be willing to 
adjust the Assessment to improve efficiency and fairness. If Nevada’s unse-
cured-bond pretrial-release program is introduced thoughtfully and with cau-
tion, it should be successful. 
Beyond Las Vegas, the state’s addition of an unsecured-bond pretrial-
release program would be well received in the rural areas. For example, Nevada 
County, located in California near Northern Nevada, recently implemented a 
type of unsecured-bond pretrial-release program to “help alleviate impacts on 
the jail yet add accountability to defendants waiting to go to trial.”222 The pro-
gram refers defendants for a risk analysis and allows for the release of qualify-
ing defendants under court supervision. The county notes the program’s suc-
cess in larger cities and expects a significant reduction in cost from reduced 
incarcerations. 
It is evident that the implementation of an unsecured-bond pretrial-release 
program in Nevada would offer significant improvement to the current bail in-
dustry. The program would be fairly easy to adopt, as Nevada courts already 
conduct a limited pretrial-release analysis for some defendants. Statistics show 
that an unsecured-bond system provides the same rates of public safety and 
court appearances, but without the negative effects of the commercial bail in-
dustry, such as jail overcrowding and vigilante bondsmen. Even if Nevada 
chose to start small in implementing unsecured-bond pretrial release, the bene-
fits of the program are worth the reform efforts.  
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CONCLUSION 
Nevada is ready to implement an unsecured-bond pretrial-release program 
of its own. The purpose of bail is not to punish a criminal defendant, nor to 
prohibit future criminal conduct. Quite simply, bail is a “procedural mechanism 
that seeks to serve the dual purpose of promoting law enforcement by encour-
aging defendants to return to court, while simultaneously upholding the pre-
sumption of innocence that is a hallmark of the American legal system.”223 Ne-
vada’s current bail industry fails to promote either function. Under a 
commercial secured-bond system, many defendants are left to languish behind 
bars or suffer the harassment of bondsmen and bounty hunters. An unsecured-
bond pretrial-release system offers the same rates of community safety and de-
fendant court appearance, while conserving judicial resources and treating de-
fendants with dignity. In a society where “liberty is the norm,” releasing de-
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